Lab Home | Phone | Search
Center for Nonlinear Studies  Center for Nonlinear Studies
 Home 
 People 
 Current 
 Executive Committee 
 Postdocs 
 Visitors 
 Students 
 Research 
 Publications 
 Conferences 
 Workshops 
 Sponsorship 
 Talks 
 Seminars 
 Postdoc Seminars Archive 
 Quantum Lunch 
 Quantum Lunch Archive 
 P/T Colloquia 
 Archive 
 Ulam Scholar 
 
 Postdoc Nominations 
 Student Requests 
 Student Program 
 Visitor Requests 
 Description 
 Past Visitors 
 Services 
 General 
 
 History of CNLS 
 
 Maps, Directions 
 CNLS Office 
 T-Division 
 LANL 
 
Tuesday, November 08, 2011
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM
CNLS Conference Room (TA-3, Bldg 1690)

Smart Grid

Modeling Distributed Decision-Making for Smart Transmission in Deregulated Electricity Markets

Seth Blumsack
Penn State University

Broad smart-grid implementation could enable the deployment of flexible and adaptive transmission networks, thus allowing for the transmission topology to be optimized depending on electricity demand and other system conditions. One suite of technologies that would facilitate real-time transmission optimization includes Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS), which use power-electronic switching to enact fast changes to the electrical network topology. FACTS technologies could be centrally controlled by system operators, as is the currently the case with transmission assets, or they could be dispatched alongside generation in hourly electricity markets. We formulate the profit-maximizing objective of FACTS device owners and the cost-minimization objective of transmission system operators as a multi-level Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints, and characterize equilibrium in such a market on small systems. Bidding by FACTS devices introduces non-convexities into the market that can lead to so-called “Nash Traps” under which local optima are mis-identified when computing market equilibria. We examine strategic bidding behavior under multiple compensation mechanisms by FACTS device owners. When FACTS devices are compensated using a clearing price-mechanism, the owners of such devices have incentives to relieve congestion in transmission-constrained systems. When FACTS devices are compensated based on locational price differentials, device owners no longer have the same incentives. FACTS devices may be characterized as transmission-type assets, but in a market design context should be treated more like generation assets.

Host: Russell Bent, Energy and Infrastructure Analysis D-4/Decision Applications